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DISCOVERING IDENTITY IN CIVIL
PROCEDURE
ANTHONY V. ALFIERI*
Speak up, baby.
-Reverend Dorothy Washington
"Coconut Grove Ministerial Alliance Meeting"
I. INTRODUCTION
This Review explores the story of Floride Norelus-an undocumented
Haitian immigrant-her civil rights lawyers, and the judges who did not
believe them. The backdrop for Norelus's story comes out of Ariela J.
Gross's new book, What Blood Won 't Tell: A History of Race on Trial in
America.' In What Blood Won't Tell, Gross, an elegant historian and
eloquent storyteller, enlarges an already distinguished body of work on
slavery,2 race, 3 and antebellum trials4 to investigate the changing meaning
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1. ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON'T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA
(2008).
2. See generally ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN COURTROOM (2000) (discussing civil disputes involving slaves as property);
Ariela Gross, Slavery, Antislavery, and the Coming of the Civil War, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LAW IN AMERICA 280 (Christopher Tomlins & Michael Grossberg eds., 2008) (revealing how law and
legal claims shaped both slavery and antislavery views); Ariela Gross, When Is the Time of Slavery?
The History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal and Political Argument, 96 CAL. L. REV. 283 (2008)
(exploring the ways in which slavery has been discussed in court opinions, political dialogues,
affirmative action, and reparations); Ariela J. Gross, Book Review, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97 (1998)
(reviewing PHILIP SCHWARZ, SLAVE LAWS IN VIRGINIA (1996)); Ariela J. Gross, The Contraction of
Freedom, 28 REVIEWS AM. HIST. 255 (2000) (reviewing AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION
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of identity in law and litigation. Bridging the study of law and culture, she
constructs, or rather reconstructs, identity-both race and gender-from
the artifacts of local knowledge expressed in social performance and
scientific expertise.' Gross points to two "key moments" in American
history when racial and gender identity were "particularly fraught"--
initially, when "racial identity trials shifted from more routine
adjudications of ancestry to intense contests about science and
performance," and subsequently, when jingoist and nativist movements
ignited "efforts to define the boundaries of citizenship racially." 6 During
these moments, she notes, the forum for the "determination of racial
identity" moved to the local courthouse, "a key arena throughout the
nineteenth century for struggles over identity."' At local courthouses, Gross
explains, trials of racial and gender identity "reverberated through
American culture." 8 Indeed, for Gross and others, the "cultural arena" of
(1998)).
3. See generally Ariela J. Gross, "'Like Master, Like Man ": Constructing Whiteness in the
Commercial Law of Slavery, 1800-1861, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 263 (1996) (describing how law helped
define white masculinity in the antebellum South); Ariela Gross, "Of Portuguese Origin ": Litigating
Identity and Citizenship Among the "Little Races" in Nineteenth-Century America, 25 LAW & HIST.
REV. 467 (2007) (explaining how "racially ambiguous communities" could obtain full U.S. citizenship
only by abandoning self-govemance and distancing themselves from people of African descent); Ariela
J. Gross, Commentary, Texas Mexicans and the Politics of Whiteness, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 195 (2003)
(positing that Texas courts have engaged in "cultural racism" against Mexican Americans by relying on
unsubstantiated cultural stereotypes); Ariela J. Gross, "The Caucasian Cloak": Mexican Americans and
The Politics of Whiteness in The Twentieth-Century Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J. 337 (2007) (explaining that
discrimination on the basis of language or culture can amount to racial discrimination); Ariela Gross,
Book Review, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 686 (2000) (reviewing MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK
MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH (1997)).
4. See generally Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998) (examining how race was "performed," and
thereby created, by trial witnesses and litigants throughout the nineteenth century); Ariela Gross,
Pandora's Box: Slave Character on Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 267
(1995) (discussing how the introduction of slave testimony and the associated risk that slaves might
deceive whites threatened judges' conceptual ability to see slaves as pure property),
5. See generally Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and
Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640 (2001) (exploring how the field of cultural-legal history has
transformed historians' understandings of slavery, race, and gender); Ariela Gross, Reflections on Law,
Culture, and Slavery, in SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 57 (Winthrop D. Jordan ed., 2003)
(discussing both the great possibilities and potential pitfalls of the new field of cultural-legal history in
analyzing how law and culture shaped racial and gendered identity in the South); Ariela Gross, The Law
and the Culture of Slavery: Natchez, Mississippi, in LOCAL MATrERS: RACE, CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 92 (Christopher Waldrep & Donald G. Nieman eds., 2001)
(combining the approaches of legal and cultural historians to examine how both the courthouse and the
slave market shaped Southern culture).
6. GROSS, supra note 1, at 13.
7. Id. at 14.
8. Id. at 12.
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the courthouse and the legal case at stake "could fix the identity of an
individual or an entire national group with a conclusiveness that was hard
to overturn." 9
Because of its cultural import, Gross argues that "law has been a
crucial institution in the process of creating racial meaning at every
level."'" Both trials and trial transcripts, she observes, disclose "glimpses
of ordinary people's, as well as lower-level legal actors', understandings of
legal and racial categories and of their own places in the racial hierarchy.""
' I
Race trials, Gross emphasizes, "brought to the surface conflicting
understandings of identity latent in the culture, and brought into
confrontation everyday ways of understanding race with definitions that fit
into the official, well-articulated racial ideology that supported the
maintenance of slavery and postwar racial hierarchy."' 12 Witnesses,
lawyers, and litigants who were entangled in this cultural conflict "learned
to tell stories that resonated with juries" and judges; in doing so, they
actively participated in "the day-to-day creation of race."
13
This Review extends Gross's historical scrutiny of identity trials to
contemporary civil rights debates over the construction of race in law and
litigation. The Review is divided into three parts. Part II maps Gross's
analysis of racial identity trials, explicating her notions of racialized
common sense and performance. Part III examines the trial and appellate
litigation in Floride Norelus's civil rights case. Part IV considers alternative
approaches to civil rights litigation embodied in identity performance and
empowerment strategies.
9. Id. See also Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un) Covering Identity in Civil Rights and Poverty Law, 121
HARV. L. REv. 805, 816-17 (2008) (explaining that the "public performance of difference" can
encourage stereotyping and cultural discrimination).
10. GROSS, supra note 1, at 12.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (commenting that "stories people told in the courtroom setting took on life, not only in
future cases but in lessons learned as well by the neighbors who participated as witnesses, jurors, and
audience members, and those that traveled through gossip, newspaper accounts, and literary
narratives").
2010]
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II. IDENTITY TRIALS IN ANTEBELLUM AND POSTBELLUM
HISTORY
always white before the law
-Ariela J. Gross
What Blood Won't Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America
In What Blood Won't Tell, Gross explores the "significance of race for
citizenship and equality" in American law.14 To Gross, racial identity trials
show "both the power and limits of individual action in the history of race
and racism."' 5 The trials, she remarks, tell "stories about the hidden marks
of race" embedded in actions, demeanor, character, and the body itself.'6
Common to local American courts in the late eighteenth century through
much of the twentieth century, the trials featured "people of European,
African, Asian, Mexican, and Native American ancestry" and spanned the
Deep South, the industrial North, and the far West. 17 In the antebellum
South, Gross points out, slaves in freedom suits "put their own racial
identity at issue" claiming that "they were really white."' 8 Others, often
free people of color, resisted private and public status-based challenges to
their racial identity and social standing.' 9 Animated by the ideology of
white supremacy, the challenges "made it increasingly important to align
the slave/free boundary with black and white, giving rise to more hotly
contested trials of racial identity." 20
Gross focuses on slave society, the Civil War era, and the postbellum
South where white ideologues "redoubled their efforts to maintain white
supremacy in political and social life" by inflicting state-sanctioned
violence, enacting Jim Crow laws, and enforcing segregationist social
practices. 21 Jim Crow laws, she comments, imposed state "limitations on
sex and marriage across the color line," engendering "continued trials of
racial identity." 22 Gross tracks these identity trials to chart "the changing
meanings of race" and the evolution of racial categories through the
twentieth century, categories that shaped "the attributes of citizenship for
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. ("Individuals of ambiguous racial identity, especially free people of color, challenged
Southerners' equation of slavery with blackness and freedom with whiteness.").
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 5-6 ("Jim Crow segregation pressured people of multiple, contested, or ambiguous
racial identities to come down on the white or black side of the color line.").
[Vol. 83:453
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the men and women who were their subjects. 23
Gross configures the attributes of citizenship in dual terms of "formal
legal citizenship" and "full social and political citizenship." 24 To Gross,
race stands central to "formal legal citizenship" and "to the larger sense of
membership in the polity." 25 Women and people of color, she
demonstrates, "were excluded from citizenship in this second, larger sense"
of political and social participation.26 As a consequence, "only white [men]
could become-and were seen as capable of becoming-citizens." 27
Gross locates the roots of citizenship in the widespread belief that
"race is a fact of nature" or "a property of blood. '28 Put simply, she
declares that "we are certain that we ought to know it when we see it." 29
Building on this intuition, Gross defines race as a form of common sense
ideology, "which came into being and changed forms at particular moments
in history as the product of social, economic, and psychological
conditions." 30 Crucial to that common sense "racial thinking" is a
"hierarchy of power" predicated on "the notion that the categories of white,
black, brown, yellow, and red mark meaningful distinctions among human
beings" and that such categories "reflect inferiority and superiority, a
human Chain of Being, with white at the top and black on the bottom."
31
Hierarchy notwithstanding, Gross admits that Americans "have never
reached a consensus about what race means or how to discover it."32
Instead, Gross learns, Americans deploy black and white color-coded
"legal presumptions" that regulate status, experienced as freedom and
enslavement.33 She links racial status to the lived experience of individuals,
groups, and whole communities, signified by "appearance, ancestry,
performance, reputation, associations, science, national citizenship, and
cultural practice." 34 Advancing into the mid-nineteenth century, she
discovers that "both the science and the performance of race became
increasingly important to the determination of racial status."35 Even in the
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at8-9.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id.
34. Id
35. Id.
2010]
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late nineteenth century, she adds, "trials of racial identity continued to
center on both medical expertise about race and community observation
and retelling of racial performances. '"36 Accordingly, judges, lawyers,
jurors, and witnesses treated race as a "common sense" mix of "scientific
fact" and social performance.
37
Gross points to common sense as an expression of "the power of local
law and local culture in creating the ideas and norms that shape our
lives." 38 In this way, she cautions, neither race nor racial status was
"something imposed from above, imagined by experts and acquiesced in by
ordinary people., 39 Rather, she insists, "race was created and re-created
every day through the workings of community institutions and individuals
in daily life."'40 In race trials, she reports, "courts gave effect to
communities' racial knowledge," effectively "reshap[ing] their racial
order" and "reimagin[ing] the future by reinventing their pasts."41 During
the decades of Reconstruction and Jim Crow in particular, she reveals,
"individuals in the courtroom increasingly emphasized race as association,
an understanding of the concept that could make sense only in a segregated
world, in which people associated only with those of their own race.,, 42 To
be sure, for Gross and others, "what happened in the courtroom is not a
faithful mirror of people's internal beliefs, their self-understandings, or
even their interactions in the social world beyond the courtroom.
43
Nonetheless, in the instrumental context of the courtroom, "people told sto-
ries about racial identity strategically-in order to win their cases, in order
to put themselves in a favorable light, in order to constitute their commu-
nities in a certain way and to ostracize outsiders." 44 Situated at the
intersection of law and culture, stories in effect forged a common sense of
race.
36. Id. at 9-10.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Gross mentions that litigating identity at the margins among "the smaller number of
people who were not clearly marked 'white' or 'negro' mattered tremendously in the history of race and
racism" both because a "significant number of people whose identity was not fixed by appearance, or
even by a confluence of appearance, status, ancestry, and associations," inhabited the margins and
because "the margins of a category create the core." Id. at 11.
43. Id. at 12. See also Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons
of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2119 (1991) (lamenting that lawyer-driven narratives tend to
silence or distort client voices so that "[w]hat is communicated, both publicly and privately, is a vision
of the world constructed by lawyer-spoken narratives").
44. GROSS, supra note 1, at 12.
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A. RACE AS COMMON SENSE
Gross traces two contradictory notions of race-"race as clear-cut
identity" and "race as ever-shifting category"-across three centuries of
American history. Both notions, she argues, construct "our contemporary
'common sense' of race."4 5 This intuitive sense-"what we know without
being aware that we know it"-posits race and racial status as not only
"self-evident," but also "central to people's identities and a crucial factor in
determining their social lives, their economic opportunities, and the way
they were perceived by others."4 6 Within antebellum American law, Gross
exposes two categories of race-black and white. She relates "blackness"
to "absolute chattel slavery" and "whiteness" to a combination of "poor and
non-slaveholding whites" and "wealthy planters and slaveholders."47
Moreover, she connects "races" to "broad divisions of humankind marked
by physiological difference and color, and organized hierarchically into a
chain of being: white, brown, yellow, red, black."
48
Gross locates these divisions in the cultural underpinnings of race
trials where "[r]acial knowledge resided not in documents but in
communities" and where local juries "required reputation evidence" to
make status determinations.4 9 Racial identity trials, Gross maintains, relied
on reputation evidence and a community-based common sense of race.
Carefully parsing trial transcripts, she shows that courts routinely allowed
hearsay and reputation evidence as "the only way to know someone's
race." 50 Race in this way evolved in antebellum America as "a matter for
community consensus" and "common sense," bolstered by legal
documentation, reputation, and behavior. 5 1 Instructively, Gross comments,
"race became an essential category, an all-encompassing definition of who
you were and where you belonged in the social sphere."
52
At trial, Gross observes, "racial identity became a question of per-
formance, reputation, and common sense."5 3 Searching for "an ineffable
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id. at 16-17.
47. Id. at 20. More precisely, Gross writes that whiteness "served to mobilize poor and non-
slaveholding whites on the side of wealthy planters and slaveholders." Id. In this way, racial identity
transcends class and socioeconomic difference. See RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE
59-123 (2005) (discussing identities as collective action).
48. GROSS, supra note 1, at 20.
49. Id. at 24.
50. Id. at 25.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 27.
53. Id. at 31.
2010]
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something that made someone white,"5 4 lay witnesses, she illustrates,
"focused on [a person's] social identity, her associations with white people,
and her performances. 55 Both judges and juries looked to behavior,
employing "common sense to make visual inspections and hear testimony
about reputation,"56 especially "descriptions of appearance-skin color,
hair, eyes, and features." 57 In this respect, Gross reiterates, courts affirmed
"the community's role in determining and policing racial identity. ' 58 Yet,
by the mid-nineteenth century, she notes, the notion of expert knowledge
and "racial 'science"' became increasingly important to the adversary
performance of race trials. 59
B. RACE AS PERFORMANCE
Gross contends that identity trials evolved from "a series of
contradictions" in antebellum law and culture concerning the form and
substance of racial knowledge.6" Law, Gross points out, both recognized
and created race; indeed, "the state itself-through its legal and military
institutions-helped make people white." 6' To Gross, "two ways of
knowing race" emerged during the antebellum era: scientific and
performative. 62 Scientific knowledge hinged on expert claims of inherent or
natural racial differences. Performative knowledge rested on public and
private displays of racial status and citizenship.
Gross links each form of knowledge to the development of "ongoing
ideologies of race., 63 Racial ideologies, she asserts, rested largely "on the
antebellum notion that whiteness and blackness were self-evident
qualities." ' Whites, for example, "believed that racial identity was
obvious, something that any white person should be able recognize on
sight," and something often interwoven with gender.65 Both judges and
54. Id. at 32.
55. Id. at 37. Further, Gross notes that "[1litigants seeking to prove a person's whiteness almost
always sought to exhibit him or her to the jury." Id. at 41.
56. Id. at 39 ("Sometimes, however, lay witnesses spoke in the language of science and
expertise, and often doctors resorted to notions of common sense.").
57. Id. at 41. Gross reveals that courts allowed juries "to see and hear the widest array of
evidence" and granted "great discretion in finding the 'facts' of race." Id. at 44.
58. Id. at 44.
59. Id. at 38-39.
60. Id. at 48.
61. Id. at54.
62. Id. at 48.
63. Id. at 57.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id. at 48.
[Vol. 83:453
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juries in racial identity trials, she remarks, "gave special weight to the civic
performance of white manhood" embodied in the exercise of the political
rights and social privileges of public citizenship.66 In this way, civic rights
and privileges arose "as particularly strong markers of white manhood,"
that is, as "something" white men "did" in the public sphere of culture and
society.67
Gross finds similar forms of cultural performance among white
women. For women, however, "claims of whiteness also rested on honor"
garnered from sexual "purity" and "moral virtue." 68 Trials of freedom suits
as well as divorce, rape, and inheritance suits, she demonstrates, "required"
performances of the "qualities" of "pure white womanhood., 69 For Gross,
these qualities-"frail, virtuous, and sexually pure"-constituted "the
feminine equivalent of performing white male citizenship." 70 Exhibited in a
score of cases, black, white, and mixed litigants "performed white
womanhood by showing their beauty and whiteness in court and by
demonstrating purity and moral goodness to their neighbors."' The
"practical effect" of such performances, Gross observes, was to "make
white identity equal to a set of moral and civic virtues. '"2
The antebellum equation of race, morality, and civic virtue or sexual
purity in racial identity trials, Gross stresses, gradually changed in the Jim
Crow era. Gross traces the growth of Jim Crow segregationist ideology and
laws among the Southern and Western states, elucidating efforts to "erase[]
an earlier history of race mixing" and to "den[y] an earlier understanding of
race as more fluid, variable, and mixed.- 73 Instead of the performance of
"white identity," 74 she observes, Jim Crow era race trials advocated white
"separation," carving "a clear delineation between the capacities and
'natures' of whites and blacks" based on a belief in racial "incompatibility"
and black "inferiority." 75
66. Id. at 49.
67. Id. at 56.
68. Id. at 58.
69. Id. (commenting that "women won their cases by creating campaigns to demonstrate their
feminine whiteness in the public eye and in the popular press").
70. Id.
71. Id. at 70-71 (adding that "women of ambiguous racial identity found ways to call on the
state's protection by convincing the court that they, too, fit this feminine ideal").
72. Id. at 71 (noting that "racial ideology insisted that such virtues could be performed only by
white people").
73. Id. at 100.
74. Id. at 78 (noting that "participants in Jim Crow-era trials described a world of extensive race
mixing even as whites sought to demonstrate that race mixing had never occurred").
75. Id. at 96. Accordingly, Gross cites race trials as "a significant part of the process by which
2010]
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Despite their broad acquiescence to increasing state subjugation and
segregation, Jim Crow-era courts, Gross asserts, "continued to insist that
racial identity was a question for a jury" in its exercise of "racial common
sense," contingent on evidence and testimony drawn from "reputation,
associations, and appearance."76 Enmeshed in racial associations and
performances, litigants, Gross shows, waged "struggles to reimagine racial
relations in the past as more separate than they had been, by rewriting
individuals as purely black or white."77 Today, she adds, courts "continue
to shape narratives about the meaning of racial identity and its connections
to citizenship," thus echoing the historic binary categories of racial identity
trials. 78 The next part considers those identity narratives in the trial and
appellate contexts of Floride Norelus's civil rights litigation.
III. IDENTITY TRIALS IN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION
the degraded sexuality of a black "Jezebel"
-Ariela J. Gross
What Blood Won't Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America
In May 1994, Floride Norelus, a Haitian immigrant, 79 confided to
Miami attorney Debra Valladares "that she had suffered a horrific pattern
of sexual harassment, rape, and assault at the hands of Asif Jawaid, the
manager of a Denny's restaurant where she worked., 80 Norelus informed
Valladares that "Jawaid repeatedly forced her to have oral, vaginal, and
anal sex with him in the Denny's restaurant and at his home."81 Norelus
reported "that when she refused Jawaid's sexual demands, Jawaid assigned
her unpleasant duties or otherwise punished her."82 She recounted that
Jawaid "extracted sexual favors in exchange for job advantages, refused to
segregation was established as natural." Id. at 78.
76. Id. at 101-02. Gross explains that "[c]ourts continued to permit juries to hear and see
evidence of individuals' and their ancestors' associations, performances, and appearance, and to use
that evidence to decide whether an ancestor was in fact a 'negro."' Id. at 106.
77. Id. at 110. Gross notes that the last racial identity suit to be appealed to a state court occurred
in Louisiana in 1983. Id. at 294.
78. Id. at 295.
79. Amlong & Amlong v. Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11 th Cir. 2007). For background
on Haitian immigrants, see Alex Stepick & Alejandro Portes, Flight into Despair: A Profile of Recent
Haitian Refugees in South Florida, 20 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 329, 345 (1986) (using a random sample
survey of recently arrived Haitians to conclude that "[flew immigrant groups in recent history have
suffered unemployment, downward occupational mobility and poverty to the extent that Haitians
have").
80. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1234.
81. Id.
82. Id. Jawaid allegedly additionally "retaliated by reducing Norelus's work hours and changing
her work schedule." Id.
[Vol. 83:453
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file paperwork reflecting her alien status, and threatened to report her to the
immigration authorities."83 Norelus also related that "Jawaid forced her to
have sex with his roommate, Raheel Hameed, at their home and at another
Denny's restaurant that Hameed managed., 84 She described one occasion
when "Jawaid and Hameed took her to their home, restrained her,
repeatedly raped her, and penetrated her vagina with an object. 85
In December 1994, Valladares and a second Miami attorney, Joseph
Chambrot, with the assistance of two experienced South Florida
employment discrimination lawyers, Karen and William Amlong, filed a
civil complaint on behalf of Norelus-under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,86 the Equal Pay Act,87 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of
1992 88 -- against Denny's, Jawaid, Hameed, and others in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.89 Subsequently, in July
and December 1995, the Amlongs filed two amended complaints.90
During more than eight days of depositions in August 199591 and in
January and February 1996, Norelus reportedly demonstrated "only limited
facility with English" and behaved in a "highly emotional and erratic"
83. Id. The district court found that Norelus illegally entered the United States in 1993, noting
that she "admitted to completing a false Immigration and Naturalization Service 1-9 Employment
Eligibility Form using the name of a cousin, 'Lavictore Remy,"' and "admitted to filing false 1993 and
1994 income tax returns under the same name." Norelus v. Denny's Inc., No. 94CV2680, 2000 WL
33541630, at *2 n.l (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2000) (sanctions order), rev'd sub nom. Amlong & Amlong v.
Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230 (11 th Cir. 2007). See generally Katherine E. Melloy, Telling Truths: How
the Real ID Act's Credibility Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REv. 637 (2007)
(explaining how cultural and psychological barriers may prohibit women refugees from effectively
telling their stories and thereby unfairly tarnishing their credibility).
84. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1234.
85. Id. Valladares testified that Norelus's brother "told [her] that Jawaid had personally
confessed to having abused Norelus" and that "a Denny's employee told her ... that Jawaid 'definitely
had a thing for [Norelus] and that she was like his property."' Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). Norelus also sought damages for common law battery, invasion of
privacy, false imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well as for
negligent training, retention, and supervision. Norelus, 2000 WL 33541630, at *2. In addition, she
sought declaratory relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and costs, including attorney's
fees. Id.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (1998).
89. The complaint alleged that Norelus "was the target of sexual harassment, battery, rape,
unequal pay and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress by managers of two Denny's
restaurants over a period of several months." Norelus, 2000 WL 33541630, at * 1. The complaint also
alleged that "both of the men used their authority as Denny's managers to extort her into having
unwilling sex with them and to otherwise sexually demean and discriminate her, and that when she
complained to her supervisors, her supervisors did nothing to protect her or to prevent the conduct from
continuing." Id.
90. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1234.
91. The 1995 deposition produced a transcript of more than 1200 pages. Id. at 1235.
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manner.92 At times, "she answered questions sarcastically or otherwise
failed to respond properly" and, moreover, "lied about matters related to
her immigration status." 93 Often she "forgot key details" and offered
"inconsistent versions of the events or outright falsehoods" 94 -for
example, regarding "oral, vaginal and anal intercourse in a walk-in
freezer," "sexual intercourse inside the [Denny's] restaurant," workplace
retaliation, and post-rape medical treatment. 95 The district court found
Norelus's deposition to be "replete with falsities, misrepresentations, and
contradictions," 96 and thus discounted a sixty-three-page errata sheet
containing 868 corrections to her deposition testimony prepared by the
Amlongs as "a spurious document. 97 At the February 1996 witness
depositions of ten Denny's employees, none corroborated Norelus's
story. 98
Nonetheless, Karen Amlong testified that she remained convinced that
Norelus was telling the truth,99 explaining that the absence of corroborating
witness testimony was not unusual in cases of sexual harassment and
assault. 100 Chambrot echoed this testimony, asserting his belief in the
credibility of her allegations, based in part on her look of "fear."'' For
92. Id. at 1234-35 (explaining that "an interpreter translated the questions into Haitian French
Creole and translated Norelus's answers back into English").
93. Id. at 1235 (noting that Norelus "claimed that she did not know Lavictore Remy, the person
whose name she had falsely used to secure employment").
94. Norelus, 2000 WL 33541630, at *2.
95. Id. at *2. The district court adverted to Norelus's testimony that she had "slept with 1,000
men." Id. at *4 n.4.
96. Id. at * l.
97. Id. at *4 n.3. The appellate court observed, "[I]t is unclear ... whether Plaintiff's original or
revised version of the facts constitutes the truth." Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1236.
98. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1235.
99. Id. Karen Amlong testified:
"[W]e were convinced that our client, based on all the evidence-my own assessment of her,
her passing the polygraph examination, Ms. Stem's assessment of her after several days of
deposition testimony-that even though she may have lacked candor on peripheral issues, on
the central issues of this case she was telling the truth, and just because somebody came into
the country illegally doesn't mean that she can be raped and exploited, and that does not take
that away from her."
Id. at 1247.
100. On the absence of corroborating witness testimony in cases of sexual harassment and assault,
see Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 977-86,
1017 (2004).
101. Norelus, 2000 WL 33541630, at *6. At the magistrate hearing, when asked for the basis of
his belief in Norelus's account of sexual harassment, Chambrot testified: "Ms. Norelus' appearance.
You can't fake fear and she had it in her voice in the way she talked. She looked like someone who had
been raped. She looked like a victim, and I see them all the time . I... d at *6 n.8. Note, however, the
court's observation that "Chambrot explained that his belief in the validity of the allegations was based
solely on Plaintiff's look of 'fear,' because she 'looked like a victim."' Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
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corroboration, the Amlongs retained the services of George Slattery, a
respected polygraph expert, to conduct examinations of Norelus in January
and April 1996. Slattery twice "unambiguously concluded.., that Norelus
was telling the truth about her core allegations of sexual abuse, rape, and
assault."' 0 2 For further corroboration, the Amlongs consulted with Dr.
Astrid Schutt-Aine, a Creole-speaking psychologist, who opined that
Norelus "appeared to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder."'10
3
Norelus's second deposition spanned three days in September 1996.
Once again, she reportedly displayed "erratic and at times inappropriate"
behavior.' °4 As a consequence, the defendants' attorneys adjourned the
deposition. In December 1996, following a battery of discovery disputes,
the district court dismissed the action to punish Norelus for failing to
comply with the court's discovery orders. In January 1997, four of the
defendants moved for sanctions against Norelus and the Amlongs. The
district court referred the sanctions motion to a magistrate for a report and
recommendation.10 5
In February 1998, after an extensive hearing, the magistrate issued a
report finding that the Amlongs "genuinely believed" in the merits of
Norelus's claims in spite of her "inability to testify completely and
truthfully about several aspects of her case."'0 6 The report also found that
the Amlongs "did not ignore [Norelus]'s propensity to exaggerate or lie
during her deposition," pointing to the results of the polygraph
Contrary to the court's assertion, Chambrot did not state that his belief was based solely on Norelus's
look of fear.
102. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1235. The legal system is largely insensitive to women who have been
raped at work. See generally Martha S. Davis, Rape in the Workplace, 41 S.D. L. REV. 411 (1996)
(revealing that Title VII, the Worker's Compensation Act, and common law tort actions do not provide
a suitable remedy for women who have been raped in the workplace and noting courts' inconsistent
treatment of rape claims); Andrea Giampetro-Martin, M. Neil Browne & Kathleen Maloy, Rape at
Work: Just Another Slip, Twist, and Fall Case?, 11 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 67 (2000) (asserting that the
Worker's Compensation Act's failure to provide an adequate remedy to women who have been raped at
work is a reflection of gender bias in the legal system). Thus, the Norelus court's dismissive treatment
of Norelus's claims is unfortunately not entirely surprising.
103. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1235. On posttraumatic stress disorder among victims of sexual abuse,
rape, and assault, see Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a Behavioral Science
Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 591 (2000) (discussing the
history and psychology of rape trauma syndrome and courts' misunderstanding of the syndrome), and
David P. Valentiner et al., Coping Strategies and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Female Victims of
Sexual and Nonsexual Assault, 105 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 455 (1996) (studying the use and effect of
coping strategies by female assault victims).
104. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1236.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1243.
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examinations.' 0 7 Additionally, the report found that the "care and detail"
reflected in the Amlongs' preparation of the deposition errata sheet
signaled "grave concern to tell an accurate story," confirming their
"legitimate desire to present their client's case truthfully and accurately."'
0 8
On these facts, the magistrate reasoned that the Amlongs "did the best they
could with a most difficult client and did not try to prolong the case or
multiply these proceeding[s] to gain a tactical advantage over their
adversaries."' 09 To the contrary, he credited Karen Amlong's testimony
that Norelus proved a "difficult client because of language barriers and
because of the degree to which she had been traumatized."" 0 Lacking
evidence of "willful abuse of the judicial process" or "reckless disregard of
duty," the magistrate concluded that the Amlongs' litigation conduct did
not amount to bad faith sufficient to justify sanctions.111 Accordingly, he
recommended that the court assess attorney's fees against Norelus alone. 112
The district court rejected the magistrate's factual findings and legal
conclusions without a hearing and rendered supplemental findings based on
the court's own independent interpretation of the record. The district court
described the case as "replete with lewd, lascivious and sexually graphic
allegations that find no evidentiary support whatsoever in the record."' 3
Specifically, the court found that the Amlongs failed to "conduct a
reasonable investigation of the facts" and prepared the errata sheet "in an
effort to cover up flaws and inconsistencies in [Norelus]'s account of
events," thereby demonstrating "unreasonable, vexatious behavior that
unnecessarily multiplied [the] proceedings.""' Hence, the district court
ordered the Amlongs to pay the defendants' attorney's fees and costs in the
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1236, 1244.
109. Id. at 1244.
110. Id. at 1248. The court of appeals noted that "[tihe magistrate judge was plainly troubled by
the reported language and cultural difficulties. Indeed, he found that the errata sheet showed 'the
difficulty plaintiff had in dealing with the discovery process including her deposition."' Id. ("Once, the
plaintiff apparently used a Creole idiom, 'tous les jours,' to communicate that Jawaid forced her to
perform oral sex 'many times' or 'all the time,' but the interpreter translated the idiom literally as
every day,' thus changing the details of the plaintiffs story.").
11l. Norelus v. Denny's Inc., No. 94CV2680, 2000 WL 33541630, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21,
2000) (sanctions order), rev'd sub nom. Amlong & Amlong v. Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230 (11 th Cir.
2007).
112. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1251 (holding that the conduct of the Amlongs' did not amount to bad
faith).
113. Norelus, 2000 WL 33541630, at *4 n.4. The district court remarked that witnesses testified
that Norelus "herself acted in an inappropriate sexual manner at work." Id. at *6.
114. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1244-45.
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amount of $389,739.07.115
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that the district court's actions-rejecting the magistrate judge's demeanor-
intensive credibility determinations, substituting its own contrary findings
without conducting a new hearing, and holding the Amlongs jointly liable
for fees and costs--exceeded its authority and abused its discretion. 116 The
court of appeals credited the magistrate's belief that "the polygraph
examinations were a genuine effort to discern the truth, not a fraudulent
attempt to create a false veneer of diligence" and that the production of the
errata sheet had been "motivated" by the Amlongs' "grave concern to tell
an accurate story" and their well-intentioned effort to mitigate Norelus's
"emotional instability and substantial language and cultural barriers." 117
The court of appeals complained that the district court "unequivocally
rejected the magistrate judge's factual findings and conclusions of law
regarding both the Amlongs' subjective intent and their objective
conduct." ' 1 8 Finding a "direct repudiation" of the magistrate's credibility
findings, the court reversed the sanction order as invalid and an abuse of
discretion, holding that "a district court may not override essential,
demeanor-intensive fact finding by a magistrate judge without hearing the
evidence itself or citing an exceptional justification for discarding the
magistrate judge's findings."' '119
IV. RELITIGATING IDENTITY TRIALS
law is not made from above
-Ariela J. Gross
What Blood Won't Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America
Gross reports that racial identity trials established whiteness as "a
prerequisite for citizenship" and proffered "civic acts as the proof of
whiteness."120 For Gross, the trials leave a narrative legacy deeply
"ingrained in our thought, our legal system, our cultural practice, and our
racial common sense." 121 Lawyers and judges, she points out, "continue to
reproduce racial hierarchy through seemingly neutral practices that
115. Id. at 1237.
116. Id. at 1251-52 ("[T]he district court improperly discarded the findings of fact made by the
magistrate judge and substituted its own.").
117. Id. at1248.
118. !d. at 1248-49.
119. Id. at 1249-50.
120. GROSS, supra note 1, at 295.
121. Id.
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perpetuate established patterns of power and privilege."' 122
In the case of Floride Norelus and in the field of civil rights more
generally, lawyers and judges likewise reproduce racial hierarchy in culture
and society through the neutral formalism of advocacy and adjudication. In
advocacy, neutral formalism dictates colorblind conventions of pleading,
pretrial discovery, and trial practice that isolate individuals from their
community settings and sever personal identities from their cultural and
social contexts. In adjudication, neutral formalism directs colorblind
judgments of conduct and credibility independent of the identity-based
differences of language, culture, and social history.
Under the jurisprudence of neutral formalism, the conventions of
advocacy and the judgments of adjudication give rise to "common sense"
presumptions and inferences concerning individual consent, intent, and
responsibility. Gross reveals that both advocates and adjudicators deploy
science to support and, at other times, to contradict the findings and
conclusions of common sense reasoning. In the instant case, for example,
the Amlongs retained the services of a polygraph expert and a Creole-
speaking psychologist to test the truth of Norelus's allegations of sexual
assault and to corroborate her symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder.
Although that expert testimony, and its scientific undergirding, stood
uncontradicted, it failed to overcome the district court's common sense
dismissal of Norelus's claims as "baseless."' 123
Norelus's litigation failure confirms Gross's thesis of the privilege-
reinforcing power of "common sense" to inscribe identity with racialized or
gendered meaning and to imbue identity with moral character,
notwithstanding countervailing evidence. Rooted in racial knowledge, that
privilege-reinforcing power, Gross maintains, draws on the predominant
cultural "understanding of individuals' appearance, reputation, civic and
social performances, and associations." 124  Here as elsewhere, the
predominant perception of low-wage undocumented immigrant women of
color in contemporary sexual harassment litigation evokes images of
"sexually graphic innuendo" and narratives of "hav[ing] slept with 1,000
men." 125 In this way, Gross indicates, contemporary civil rights litigation
122. Id.
123. Norelus v. Denny's Inc., No. 94CV2680, 2000 WL 33541630, at *15 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21,
2000) (sanctions order), rev'd sub nom. Amlong & Amlong v. Denny's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230 (11 th Cir.
2007).
124. GROSS, supra note 1, at 296.
125. Norelus, 2000 WL 33541630, at *4 n.4. Indeed, the court of appeals noted that Norelus "slept
with over 1000 men," thus illustrating the permeation of the perception of immigrant women as
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continues to "regulat[e] citizenship" in accordance with historically
racialized and gendered categories while simultaneously operating to
produce those same categories through the "performance of citizenship."' 126
Like the antebellum and Jim Crow courts of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, the Norelus and Amlong courts invoke a combination
of reputation, performance, and association in determining racial identity.
Both trial and appellate courts reflect Gross's sense of "the persistence of
the idea of racial 'performance"' in race and gender identity litigation. 127
Both implicitly and explicitly, the courts equate Norelus's "civic acts and
displays of moral and social character" with the subordinate categories of
racial identity and inferior ranks of social hierarchy she inhabits. 128 In the
Norelus case, as in other areas of immigration litigation,'29 "the discourse
of racial performance" that Gross articulates and the connection that she
draws "between racial identity and fitness for citizenship ... remains
potent."'
130
In this important respect, Gross's "common sense" of race-her
notion that "we know it when we see it"--proves "surprisingly durable." 13 1
The history of the Norelus trial, for example, shows that a common sense
of race and gender pervades law, litigation, and the legal system. This
community racial knowledge rewards litigants who perform and pass into
whiteness and womanhood with "full legal and social citizenship."'132
Conversely, community racial knowledge punishes litigants who, like
Floride Norelus, fail in their cultural performance of white womanhood.
Constrained by culture, language, and race, Norelus falters in her claims of
promiscuous. Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1256 (emphasis added). This is especially disconcerting because it
was the appellate court that generally held a more sympathetic view toward Norelus. Thus, while the
appellate court's insertion of the word "over" was probably not out of ill will, it nonetheless reflects the
appellate court's, perhaps unconcious, negative view of Norelus and, by extension, other immigrant
women who do not fit community-created definitions of whiteness and womanhood.
126. GROSS, supra note 1, at 296.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 296-97.
129. See generally John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the
Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817 (2000) (revealing the importance of the
performance of whiteness in immigration suits and policymaking); Enid Trucios-Haynes, The Legacy of
Racially Restrictive Immigration Laws and Policies and the Construction of the American National
Identity, 76 OR. L. REv. 369 (1997) (criticizing the dominance of assimilation theory in immigration
law and policy); Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural Nation: The
Challenge oflImmigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1347 (2005) (reviewing SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004)).
130. GROSS, supra note 1, at 297.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 298.
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honor, sexual purity, and moral virtue, the very core qualities of whiteness
and womanhood that Gross chronicles. To prevail at her sexual harassment
trial would have required Norelus to perform the community-bolstered and
scientifically buttressed qualities of white womanhood-precisely Gross's
feminine equivalent of performing white male citizenship. The practical
effect of such a failed performance lies in the district court's denial of
Norelus's claim to the rights and privileges of white citizenship in the
workplace.
Gross sketches three approaches to identity trials that are useful in
understanding Norelus's case and in litigating future sexual harassment and
employment discrimination cases.' 33 The first approach borrows from
conventional colorblind litigation strategies directing neutrality toward
race. Race neutral litigation, Gross notes, "refuse[s] to recognize race,"
treating it "solely as a formal category" defined "merely as 'skin color." ' 13
4
This stance, she complains, presumes "that existing racial hierarchies are
inevitable results of cultural difference" simply reflecting "wholly
reasonable cultural discrimination."' 135 In Norelus's case, neither courts nor
litigants directly challenged the overlapping hierarchies-class, gender, and
racial-framing Norelus's experience of sexual harassment, thus leaving
her and other undocumented immigrant women of color susceptible to
ongoing abuse and exploitation in the low-wage marketplace.
A second approach Gross mentions connects litigation to the politics
of identity by "asserting racial identities with pride and basing claims to
political participation... on the basis of those identities." '136 Rather than
disaggregate race and culture,'37 this approach focuses on "building
political coalitions around racial identities when it is strategically useful to
do so."'138 Like many, Gross views identity politics as a "vital expression"
133. See Christine N. Cimini, Ask, Don't Tell: Ethical Issues Surrounding Undocumented
Workers' Status in Employment Litigation, 61 STAN. L. REv. 355 (2008) (discussing the ethical
obligations of lawyers representing undocumented immigrants).
134. GROSS, supra note 1, at 299.
135. Id. at 300.
136. Id. at 300-01.
137. Although Gross later criticizes some of the more problematic aspects of identity politics, she
recognizes the value of seeing race and culture as closely intertwined by noting that "[b]ecause racism
has expressed itself in cultural terms, race and culture cannot be disaggregated without ignoring vast
realms of reinforcement of racial hierarchy." Id. at 303.
138. Id. at 301. See also Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural
Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial
Society, 81 CAL. L. REv. 863, 908-09 (1993) (arguing in favor of forming "[a] viable multiethnic,
multiracial society that recognizes a need for separatism in certain sectors").
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of "the genuine need to preserve . . . political and cultural communities." 139
Yet she warns that identity politics "cannot truly combat the work that law
has done" in preserving and reproducing racial hierarchy without enlisting
the transformative power of courts to recognize and remake race. 1
40
Unsatisfied with either the colorblind or identity-politics approach to
combating racism, Gross proposes a third approach that takes into account
discrimination "on the basis of racial performance."'' 41 Paradoxically,
Gross's "antiracist agenda" commands a return to the courts and their
legislative and administrative counterparts to "unmake" race and end the
tolerance of stereotype and stigma in civil rights advocacy and
adjudication. 142 To do so requires antiracist advocates, especially litigators,
to recognize the interconnectedness of race and culture. Among clients and
communities of color, race-based identity and community "constitute[s]
dignity-based process values that derive from fundamental notions of
personhood and self-determination" and preserve or enlarge cultural,
social, and political standing. 143 Thus, to fulfill political commitments to
democratic access and racial equality in representing undocumented
immigrants, 144 as well as other women and individuals of color in sexual
assault and harassment trials, 145 civil rights advocates must broaden their
139. GROSS, supra note 1, at 302. See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Progressive Race
Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1455, 1465-75 (2002)
(revealing the shortcomings of and ultimately rejecting "progressive race blindness" theory).
140. GROSS, supra note 1, at 302.
141. Id. at 304.
142. Id. See also Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117 (2001) (advocating that courts take into account how
women in the real world experience and react to sexual harassment instead of relying on popular
assumptions of how women "should" act in such situations).
143. Anthony V. Alfieri, Gideon in WhitelGideon in Black: Race and Identity in Lawyering, 114
YALE L.J. 1459,1461(2005).
144. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in
the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525 (2000)
(stressing the need to consider race when analyzing immigration law and policy); Cheryl Little,
InterGroup Coalitions and Immigration Politics: The Haitian Experience in Florida, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 717 (1999) (revealing the disparate treatment of Haitian immigrants compared to those from other
Latin American countries and the U.S. government's ignorance of Haitian politics and culture).
145. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Black Women's Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the
Power of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941 (2006) (urging civil rights advocates to balance the
usefulness of generalized culturally created narratives about women of color against the need to make
courts view women of color as individuals with their own unique stories); Darci E. Burrell, Myth,
Stereotype, and the Rape of Black Women, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 87 (1993) (urging feminist activists
and legal theorists to realize how stereotypes about African American men and women's sexuality deny
women of color equal legal protection); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape
Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387 (1996) (exposing the
prevalence of patriarchy in the legal system and advocating changes to courtroom rules to improve the
fairness of jury trials).
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role and function to embrace politics, culture, and society. By channeling
litigation toward broader client-community roles and relationships,
advocates may expand democratic and equality claims to political and
social spheres outside law.' 
46
V. CONCLUSION
Gross's historical analysis of identity trials carries crucial relevance to
contemporary civil rights debates over the construction of race and gender
in law and litigation. That analysis not only elucidates the notions of
racialized common sense and performance, but also illuminates the trial
and appellate strategies in Floride Norelus's case and in civil rights cases
more generally. The analysis also suggests important alternative
approaches to civil rights litigation embodied in identity performance and
empowerment strategies. The efficacy of contemporary civil rights
litigation depends on the integration of grass-roots, legal-political identity
performance and empowerment tactics within communities of low-wage
undocumented immigrant workers of color. At their most promising, these
tactics create innovative forms of collaboration between lawyers and clients
working in community-based advocacy campaigns. These new approaches
to advocacy have the potential to shift the role and function of civil rights
representation toward greater legal-political discourse and democratic
renewal. 4 7 Gross's work reveals the oppositional voices and narratives of
freedom that call out again and again for such renewal.
146. Alfieri, supra note 143, at 1481-88.
147. Id.
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